

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SUGGESTED REMARKS REFERENCE CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS TO THE HOOVER COMMISSION

I KNOW THE COMMISSION IS CONCERNED, WITH THE STATUS OF OUR FOREIGN INFORMATION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY CLANDESTINE OR SEMI-CLANDESTINE MEANS.

THERE HAS BEEN ENTIRELY TOO MUCH PUBLICITY IN THIS REGARD, FAVORABLY AND UNFAVORABLY. THE PUBLIC HAS COME TO REGARD THE COLLECTION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS A SINISTER AND DANGEROUS OPERATION BY STRICTLY ILLEGAL METHODS. WITHOUT DISCOUNTING CERTAIN ACTUAL DANGERS WHICH DO EXIST IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY BY CLANDESTINE MEANS, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE POINT THAT IT IS MOSTLY A "PICK AND SHOVEL" JOB SUPERVISED BY ABLE INTELLIGENCE OPERATORS.

~~AS YOU HAVE ALREADY BEEN INFORMED,~~ APPROXIMATELY 75% OF ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS GATHERED BY STRICTLY OPEN METHODS, THAT IS--THROUGH MILITARY, NAVAL, COMMERCIAL, AND OTHER ATTACHES; THROUGH THE STUDY OF READILY AVAILABLE BOOKS, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, RADIO BROADCASTS, PHOTOGRAPHS,

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

CONFERENCES;

25X1

25X1

ABOUT 15% OF ALL

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS COLLECTED BY CLANDESTINE OR SEMI-CLANDESTINE MEANS. BUT, WHILE THE QUANTITY IS LOWER THAN THAT COLLECTED BY OVERT METHODS, OFTEN THE QUALITY OF SUCH INFORMATION FAR OUTWEIGHS THE OTHER. ABOUT 5% OF THE POTENTIAL COLLECTIBLE INFORMATION DEFIES ALL METHODS OF COLLECTION AND ABOUT 5% EXISTS ONLY IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF TOP LEADERS IN THE TARGET COUNTRY.

YOUR INTEREST IS IN WHETHER THE JOB IS BEING WELL DONE. LET ME REMIND YOU THAT WE ARE BUILDING UP A SYSTEM, UNDER PRESSURE, AND MANY YEARS BEHIND, THAT THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE BEEN EFFICIENTLY OPERATING SINCE THE DAYS OF THE FIRST QUEEN ELIZABETH. IT IS NOT A SYSTEM WHICH CAN BE PERFECTED IN A SHORT SPACE OF TIME. OUR JUNIOR MISSION CASE OFFICERS, FOR EXAMPLE, CAN SELDOM BE PUT IN THE FIELD IN LESS THAN FOURTEEN MONTHS. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN THIS TIMING. HAVING SELECTED A CANDIDATE WHO APPEARS TO HAVE THE PROPER ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS,

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

IT TAKES US APPROXIMATELY FOUR MONTHS TO THOROUGHLY CHECK HIS PAST LIFE, HABITS, DISCRETION, LOYALTY, AND OTHER NECESSARY ATTRIBUTES. HAVING ACCEPTED THE CANDIDATE HE IS PUT THROUGH A TRAINING PERIOD OF FROM SIX TO TEN MONTHS. UPON COMPLETION OF HIS TRAINING IT REQUIRES ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR MONTHS TO ARRANGE HIS COVER AND TO PLACE HIM IN THE AREA CONCERNED. WE CAN EXPECT LITTLE FROM HIM UNTIL HE HAS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AND OPENED UP HIS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS. THIS MAY TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS.

YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN THE TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL WHO BEST FITS OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSIGNMENT AS A STATION CHIEF. LET ME ASSURE YOU HE IS NOT THE PUBLICIZED POLICE OR DETECTIVE TYPE. FIRST HE MUST HAVE AN INTENSE DESIRE TO FURTHER THE INTEREST OF HIS COUNTRY, BY ANY MEANS IF NECESSARY AND DIRECTED. HIS ACADEMIC TRAINING MUST BE UNQUESTIONED AND HE MUST BE DIGNIFIED, CALM, INTELLIGENT--AND ABLE TO DISCUSS A BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WITH INDIVIDUALS OF ANY STATURE. YOU MAY BE FURTHER INTERESTED IN KNOWING THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ~~ONE~~ ^{ONE OR TWO} ~~ONE~~ ^A OF OUR STATION CHIEFS, OCCUPYING POSITIONS IN CURRENT HOT SPOTS:


Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

25X1



THESE ARE THE TYPE MEN WE STRIVE TO
PLACE IN FOREIGN FIELDS AND AS OUR BRANCH
CHIEFS HERE IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE, WE
FEEL, BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS REGARD.

AS TO OUR SUCCESS TO DATE. LET ME
ASSURE YOU THAT THE NATION HAS JUST CAUSE
TO BE PROUD OF THE OPERATIONS OF OUR COM-
PARATIVELY YOUNG ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-
ESPIONAGE SYSTEM. UNFORTUNATELY WE CANNOT
TELL THE WORLD ABOUT OUR SUCCESSES--WE
CAN ONLY BOW TO THE CRITICISM OF OUR
FAILURES.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

ESPIONAGE IS A MOST DELICATE AS WELL AS A MOST DANGEROUS OPERATION. IT IS COMPETITIVE IN A FIELD IN WHICH NO HOLDS ARE BARRED. THE MEN WHO CONTROL THESE OPERATIONS ARE NATURALLY SECRETIVE AND ALOOF TO THE CASUAL APPROACH--FOR THEY ARE DEALING IN THE LIVES OF FELLOW AMERICANS AND PROVEN AGENTS REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY.

SUCCESS IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IS NOT BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF FAILURES. IT IS BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF "THOSE WHO NEED TO KNOW" THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS EXCEED THE FAILURES. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE "FLAPS" AND THEY WILL ALWAYS, UNFORTUNATELY, BE REFERRED TO AS "INTELLIGENCE FIASCOS" BY THE EVER PRESENT SECOND GUESSER.

ONE COMMENTATOR RECENTLY STATED:

"THE FIASCOS--THEY MIGHT BE CALLED INTELLIGENCE "CATASTROPHIES"--HAVE OCCURRED IN RUMANIA, HUNGARY, FINLAND AND ELSEWHERE." I AM SURE THAT, AS TIME GOES ON, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WILL BE ADDED TO THIS LIST. BUT IF WE ARE GOING TO JUDGE THE EFFICIENCY AND COVERAGE OF OUR CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM BY THE FACT THAT WE DO HAVE FAILURES--THEN WE SHOULD GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS!

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

IT IS HARD TO BE A HERO IN ONE'S HOME TOWN, PARTICULARLY IN A TOWN WHERE SO MANY PEOPLE ARE EXPERT IN SO MANY FIELDS. THAT CERTAINLY APPLIES TO THE CONDUCT, BY THIS COUNTRY, OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM. YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN PROOF THAT OUR PEOPLE IN THIS FIELD ARE COMPETENT AND THAT WE ARE BETTER APPRECIATED AWAY FROM HOME THAN WE ARE HERE. FURTHER, THERE ARE MANY INDIVIDUALS HERE AT HOME WHO UNDERSTAND ^{AND KNOW OUR SUCCESSES} OUR EFFORTS ^ABUT WHO, FOR SECURITY REASONS, CAN SAY LITTLE ABOUT IT. FORTUNATELY WE DO HAVE SOME RECORDS ALONG THE LINES OF COMMENDATION AND I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF BRINGING ALONG A FEW MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS. IF YOU DESIRE, AND WILL PERMIT ME TO ELIMINATE NAMES AND PLACES, I WILL BE GLAD TO DISCUSS A FEW OF THEM. FOR SECURITY REASONS THEY CANNOT BE RELEASED BUT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO EITHER MR. 25X1 BROSS, OR [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] SCREENING THEM.

HERE SUGGEST BROSS OR [REDACTED]
PICK 4 OR 5 PAPERS AT RANDOM AND
THEN PARAPHRASE THEM.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

IT IS VITAL FOR YOU TO KNOW THAT OUR CENTRALIZED OPERATION OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS A "SERVICE" TO ALL GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND IS NOT AN OPERATION FOR THE INTERESTS OF CIA ALONE. DURING THE BUILD-UP OF OUR CLANDESTINE SYSTEM OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS OF CIA OPERATION, WE HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY THE EXPERIENCE, THE SUCCESSES, AND THE FAILURES OF THE CLANDESTINE SYSTEMS OF OTHER POWERS. MANY OF OUR OPERATIONS FOLLOW A PATTERN WHICH HAS BEEN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS. YET WE FEEL THAT AMERICAN INGENUITY AND EFFICIENCY HAVE PROVIDED US WITH NEW METHODS THAT HAVE PLACED US VERY HIGH IN THE FIELD OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE. *(Interject personal feelings in this regard)*

THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS THAT OUR OPERATING PERSONNEL ARE INEXPERIENCED IN THIS FIELD. IF SECURITY WOULD PERMIT, I COULD PROVE THAT OUR OPERATING PERSONNEL, ON ANY BASIS DESIRED, ARE MORE EXPERIENCED IN THE ESPIONAGE FIELD THAN ANY OTHER GROUP OF AMERICAN NATIONALS.

THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS THAT CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHOULD NOT BE CENTRALIZED. THE VOICE OF EXPERIENCE

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

CHALLENGES SUCH STATEMENTS FROM SO MANY ANGLES THAT I WILL NOT TAKE THE TIME TO DISCUSS THEM UNLESS THE COMMITTEE PARTICULARLY DESIRES A DISCUSSION ALONG THOSE LINES.

ONE OF OUR PRIMARY TASKS IN THIS FIELD IS A CONSTANT SEARCH FOR NEW INFORMATION RELATIVE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE FOREIGN AREAS. NATURALLY THESE MATTERS TIE IN WITH OVER-ALL SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD.

~~BECAUSE OF SECURITY RESTRICTIONS, I CANNOT~~
You may be interested, etc. —
~~SHOW THIS DOCUMENT~~

DISPLAY

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] WE HAVE NO

OBJECTION, IF THE COMMITTEE DESIRES, TO PERMIT CLOSER STUDY OF THIS DOCUMENT BY EITHER MR. BROSS, OR

25X1

IT IS OBVIOUS, OF COURSE, THAT WE CANNOT COMPLETELY DIVORCE OUR FOREIGN ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO WORLD COMMUNISM

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

-8-
SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

FROM OUR OWN DOMESTIC WORRIES ALONG THE SAME LINES. THEY MUST BE TIED TOGETHER WITH CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION--AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT COOPERATION IN THIS REGARD IS OF THE HIGHEST. FURTHER, WE HAVE OUR OWN EXPERTS IN DOMESTIC COMMUNISM, EACH HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED. IN THE EVENT YOU DESIRE TO PURSUE THIS PROBLEM FURTHER I HAVE ASKED TWO OF OUR EXPERTS, BOTH FORMER MEMBERS OF THE FBI, TO BE WITH US HERE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH CAN BE ANSWERED WITHIN SECURITY RESTRICTIONS.

25X1

TO SUM UP. WE FEEL THE NATION HAS DUE CAUSE TO BE PROUD OF ITS YOUNG BUT INCREASINGLY SUCCESSFUL CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.- THE CONTINUED GROWTH AND ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM DEPENDS UPON A FULL REALIZATION OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED FOR EVER-IMPROVING SECURITY. THE SYSTEM NEEDS TIME FOR FULL FRUITION AND IT NEEDS THE MAXIMUM OF FREEDOM FROM PUBLICITY AND INQUIRY. THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED ARE, WE BELIEVE, SELECTED AND SCREENED AS NO OTHER GOVERNMENTAL GROUP HAS BEEN SELECTED AND SCREENED. THERE WILL

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

ALWAYS BE FAILURES IN THE FIELD--BUT I ASK YOU AGAIN TO REALIZE THAT SUCH FAILURES ARE THE HAZARDS OF A VERY DANGEROUS GAME. OUR SUCCESSES MUST REMAIN COMPARATIVELY UNKNOWN.

THIS IS BUT A VERY GENERAL REVIEW OF OUR CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THERE ARE NO DOUBT MANY QUESTIONS STILL IN YOUR MIND REGARDING THIS WORK. WHERE I CAN, WITH DUE REGARD TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS, I WILL FRANKLY AND HONESTLY TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU DESIRE TO ASK.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SUGGESTED REMARKS REFERENCE CLANDESTINE
OPERATIONS TO THE HOOVER COMMISSION

I know the Commission is concerned, with the status of our foreign information collection activities conducted by clandestine or semi-clandestine means.

There has been entirely too much publicity in this regard, favorably and unfavorably. The public has come to regard the collection of all intelligence information as a sinister and dangerous operation by strictly illegal methods. Without discounting certain actual dangers which do exist in the collection of information, particularly by clandestine means, I would like to stress the point that it is mostly a "pick and shovel" job supervised by able intelligence operators.

Approximately 75% of all intelligence information is gathered by strictly open methods, that is—through military, naval, commercial, and other attaches; through the study of readily available books, magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, photographs, conferences;

25X1

ABOUT 10% OF ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS COLLECTED BY CLANDESTINE OR SEMI-CLANDESTINE MEANS. BUT, WHILE THE QUANTITY IS LOWER THAN THAT COLLECTED BY OVERT METHODS, OFTEN THE QUALITY OF SUCH INFORMATION FAR OUTWEIGHS THE OTHER. ABOUT 10% OF THE POTENTIAL COLLECTIBLE INFORMATION DEFIES ALL METHODS OF COLLECTION AND ABOUT 5% EXISTS ONLY IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF TOP LEADERS IN THE TARGET COUNTRY.

Your interest is in whether the job is being well done. Let me remind you that we are building up a system, under pressure and many years behind, that the British, for example, have been efficiently operating since the days of the first Queen Elizabeth. It is not a system which can be perfected in a short space of time. Our junior mission case officers, for example, can seldom be put in the field in less than fourteen months. You may be interested in this timing. Having selected a candidate who appears to have the proper academic, cultural, moral, and physical requirements, it takes us approximately four months to thoroughly check his past life, habits, discretion, loyalty, and other necessary attributes. Having accepted the candidate he is put through a training period of from six to ten months. Upon completion of his training it requires another three to four months to arrange his cover and to place him in the area concerned. We can expect little from him until he has firmly established himself and opened up his communications channels. This may take several months.

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

You may be interested in the type of individual who best fits our requirements for assignment as a station chief. Let me assure you he is not the publicized police or detective type. First he must have an intense desire to further the interest of his country, by any means if necessary and directed. His academic training must be unquestioned and he must be dignified, calm, intelligent—and able to discuss a broad range of subjects with individuals of any stature. You may be further interested in knowing the general background of some of our station chiefs, occupying positions in current hot spots:

25X1

[Redacted]

These are the type men we strive to place in foreign fields and as our branch chiefs here in Washington. We have, we feel, been very successful in this regard.

As to our success to date. Let me assure you that the nation has just cause to be proud of the operations of our comparatively young espionage and counter-espionage system. Unfortunately we cannot tell the world about our successes—we can only bow to the criticism of our failures.

Espionage is a most delicate as well as a most dangerous operation. It is competitive in a field in which no holds are barred. The men who control these operations are naturally secretive and aloof to the casual approach—for they are dealing in the lives of fellow Americans and proven agents regardless of nationality.

Success in clandestine operations is not based on the absence of failures. It is based on the knowledge of "those who need to know" that the successful operations exceed the failures. There will always be "flaps" and they will always, unfortunately, be referred to as "intelligence fiascos" by the ever present second guesser.

One commentator recently stated:

"The fiascos—they might be called intelligence "catastrophies"—have occurred in Rumania, Hungary, Finland and elsewhere."

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

I am sure that, as time goes on, many other countries will be added to this list. But if we are going to judge the efficiency and coverage of our clandestine intelligence system by the fact that we do have failures--then we should get out of the business!

It is hard to be a hero in one's own home town, particularly in a town where so many people are expert in so many fields. That certainly applies to the conduct, by this country, of an espionage system. You will be interested in proof that our people in this field are competent and that we are better appreciated away from home than we are here. Further, there are many individuals here at home who understand our efforts but who, for security reasons, can say little about it. Fortunately we do have some records along the lines of commendation and I have taken the liberty of bringing along a few miscellaneous items. If you desire, and will permit me to eliminate names and places, I will be glad to discuss a few of them. For security reasons they cannot be released but we have no objection to either Mr. Bross or [redacted] screening them.

25X1

{ Here suggest Bross or [redacted] pick
{ 4 or 5 papers at random and then para-
{ phrase them.

25X1

It is vital for you to know that our centralized operation of clandestine intelligence collection is a "service" to all governmental intelligence activities and is not an operation for the interests of CIA alone. During the build-up of our clandestine system over the past three years of CIA operation, we have been guided by the experience, the successes, and the failures of the clandestine systems of other powers. Many of our operations follow a pattern which has been international practice for hundreds of years. Yet we feel that American ingenuity and efficiency have provided us with new methods that have placed us very high in the field of clandestine intelligence.

There have been statements that our operating personnel are inexperienced in this field. If security would permit, I could prove that our operating personnel, on any basis desired, are more experienced in the espionage field than any other group of American nationals.

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5

SECRET

There have been statements that clandestine intelligence collection should not be centralized. The voice of experience challenges such statements from so many angles that I will not take the time to discuss them unless the Committee particularly desires a discussion along those lines.

One of our primary tasks in this field is a constant search for new information relative Communist activity in the foreign areas. Naturally these matters tie in with over-all Soviet activities in the field. Because of security restrictions, I cannot show this document

(display 

25X1

25X1



It is obvious, of course, that we cannot completely divorce our foreign activities with regard to world communism from our own domestic worries along the same lines. They must be tied together with close collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation—and I can assure you that cooperation in this regard is of the highest. Further, we have our own experts in domestic communism, each highly qualified and experienced. In the event you desire to pursue this problem further I have asked two of our experts, both former members of the FBI, to be with us here to answer any questions which can be answered within security restrictions.

To sum up. We feel the nation has due cause to be proud of its young but increasingly successful clandestine intelligence system. The continued growth and ability of the system depends upon a full realization of the sensitive nature of such activities and the need for ever-improving security. The system needs time for full fruition and it needs the maximum of freedom from publicity and inquiry. The personnel involved are, we believe, selected and screened as no other governmental group has been selected and screened. There will always be failures in the field—but I ask you again to realize that such failures are the hazards of a very dangerous game. Our successes must remain comparatively unknown.

This is but a very general review of our clandestine intelligence activities. There are no doubt many questions still in your mind regarding this work. Where I can, with due regard to security restrictions, I will frankly and honestly try to answer any questions you desire to ask.